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The events of September 11, 2001, radically altered many facets of
American life. One dramatic change was the establishment of the Federal
Department of Homeland Security, created to regulate and oversee various
aspects of the federal government in an effort to promote safety and prevent
terrorism. As part of this mission, the Department of Homeland Security now
manages the investigations that determine eligibility for security clearances
necessary for many federal government jobs.
As a result of this process, Scott Dyer was denied renewal of the secu-
rity clearance necessary for his employment as a building engineer at a fed-
eral courthouse in Denver, Colorado. 2 This denial was based on Dyer's crimi-
nal record of forgery and theft from an incident that occurred in Missouri in
1990.3 When Dyer petitioned a Missouri court for expungement of his crimi-
nal record, the Missouri Supreme Court denied Dyer's petition and upheld the
constitutionality of a statute that limits judicial authority to expunge criminal
records to situations involving a list of specific elements.
4
Although the court's decision produced the seemingly harsh result of
denying Dyer a specific avenue for regaining his federal employment, it was
ultimately consistent with precedent, constitutional law, and the policies un-
derlying both the expungement of criminal records and the relationship be-
tween the federal and state governments.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1990, Scott Dyer, then eighteen years old, stole another man's base-
ball paraphernalia, wallet, and two personal checks, which Dyer and a friend
forged.5 Afterward, the police arrested and charged Dyer with two counts of
forgery and one count of theft.6 Dyer pleaded guilty to one of the forgery
1. 163 S.W.3d 915 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
2. Id. at 917.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 920-21.
5. Id. at 917.
6. Id.
1
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charges and the theft charge, and the remaining forgery charge was dis-
missed.7 The court placed Dyer on probation for three years.8
Dyer's criminal record prevented him from renewing his security clear-
ance through the Department of Homeland Security in 2004, and as a result of
this denial, Dyer lost his job as a building engineer at a federal courthouse in
Denver, Colorado.9 Dyer filed a petition for expungement of these criminal
records,' 0 arguing that his record was eligible for statutory expungement un-
der Missouri Revised Statutes section 610.122, or in the alternative, for equi-
table expungement."1 As an alternative to these two arguments, Dyer argued
that section 610.122 violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Sections 2 and 10 of the Missouri Constitution.
12
The trial court ruled in favor of Dyer and ordered expungement of his
criminal records.' 3 The trial court's order of expungement rested on three
separate grounds: (1) Dyer satisfied the requirements of section 610.122,
which provides for statutory expungement of criminal records; (2) section
610.122 was unconstitutional in that it violated both the United States Consti-
tution and the Missouri Constitution; and (3) section 610.122 was not the
exclusive means of ordering expungement; the court's equitable powers in-
clude the order of expungement of criminal records and exercise of these
powers in Dyer's case was proper.
4
Because the trial court found section 610.122 unconstitutional, the state
had authority to appeal directly to the Missouri Supreme Court.'5 On appeal,
the state argued that the trial court's order of expungement was erroneous
because the case did not satisfy the elements of section 610.122 and the court
had no inherent equitable expungement power.' 6 The state further argued that
the trial court's holding that section 610.122 was unconstitutional was erro-
neous because the statute conformed with the Missouri Constitution's "clear
title" and "one subject matter" rules and because Dyer's equal protection and
due process rights were not violated.' 7 In response, Dyer argued that the trial
court's decision was not erroneous because equitable expungement had not




10. Brief of the State of Missouri, Sub Nom. the Criminal Records Repository at
*11, In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d 915 (No. SC86236).
11. See id. at *20-26. See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.122 (2000).
12. In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d at 920.
13. Id. at 917.
14. Id. at 918.
15. In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d at 917. See also MO. CONST. art. V, § 3.
16. Brief of the State of Missouri, Sub Nom. the Criminal Records Repository at
"17-18, In reDyer, 163 S.W.3d 915 (No. SC86236).
17. Id. at *30-31.
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that section 610.122 was constitutionally defective under the Missouri Consti-
tution's clear title and one subject matter rules.' 8
In a unanimous decision, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial
court, holding that Dyer was not entitled to statutory expungement under
section 610.122 because the requisite elements were not satisfied, that the
inherent equitable power of the judiciary to issue orders of expungement was
abrogated in Missouri by the adoption of section 610.122, and that section
610.122 did not violate Missouri's clear title and one subject matter rules or
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.19
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Equitable Expungement of Criminal Records
A substantial conflict exists among jurisdictions regarding the inherent
power of courts to expunge criminal records in the absence of an authorizing
statute. Some courts maintain that express legislative authority is necessary
for judicial power to expunge criminal records. Some courts in this group
view expungement as a distinct legislative task that involves the balancing of
public policy interests,22 while other courts base their conclusion on the def-
erence given to law enforcement agencies in determining the requirements for
disposing of criminal records.23 In contrast, other courts, including federal
courts, maintain that the judiciary has the inherent power to expunge criminal
18. Brief of Dyer at * 10, *24-25, In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d 915 (No. SC86236).
19. In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d at 918, 920-21.
20. For a discussion of the influence of the relationship between legislative ac-
tions and equitable powers, see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equita-
ble Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REv. 524 (1982).
21. See, e.g., Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1970) (holding that in the
absence of statutory authority, the court could not order the expungement of a crimi-
nal record of a person who had previously pleaded guilty to an attempt to commit
petit larceny and had completed probation); Turner v. State, 876 So. 2d 1056 (Miss.
App. 2004) (holding that the court lacked the innate power to expunge the criminal
record of a convicted person); Application of Raynor, 303 A.2d 896 (N.J. 1973)
(holding that the court was without authority to order the expungement of petitioner's
record).
22. See, e.g., Mulkey, 234 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1970) (reasoning that the question of
whether criminal records should be expunged was a question for legislative determi-
nation); Application of Raynor, 303 A.2d 896, 897 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1973) (rea-
soning that the question of the right to have arrest records expunged was a matter
within legislative discretion).
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 258 A.2d 695, 696 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1969) (reasoning that judicial expungement of criminal records would be contrary to a
statute providing law enforcement with the responsibility for maintaining custody of
records of convicted persons).
2006]
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records in limited circumstances.24 In making determinations regarding ex-
pungement of criminal records, these courts typically consider the seriousness
of the offense, the prior criminal record, age, and occupation of the convicted
person, and the specific governmental interest in retaining the criminal re-
cords.25
Prior to the adoption of the current section 610.122, Missouri courts oc-
26
casionally asserted equitable power to expunge criminal records. However,
this equitable power was limited to cases that included illegal prosecution,
acquittal, or extraordinary circumstances. 27 Further limiting the availability of
equitable expungement of criminal records in Missouri is the general re-
quirement that, to qualify for equitable relief, proof of a lack of an adequate
remedy at law is necessary. 28 Furthermore, the Missouri Supreme Court has
stated that "[u]nless a statutory scheme is plainly inadequate under circum-
stances where a court has a duty to act, there is no need for the court to exercise
its equity powers to fashion a 'better' remedy than exists in the statutes."
29
B. Statutory Expungement of Criminal Records and Section 610.122
Prior to the adoption of sections 610.100 through 610.150, Missouri
courts had no statutory expungement authority and only limited equitable
authority to expunge criminal records.30 This situation changed dramatically
in 1993, when the Missouri legislature updated and amended sections
610.100 through 610.150.3 Of particular importance is section 610.122,
which, as amended in 1995, provides:
24. See, e.g., United States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1070 (2005) (holding that federal courts have the inherent power to
expunge criminal records in appropriate and extraordinary circumstances despite a
lack of express legislative authority); State v. Schultz, 676 N.W.2d 337, 340-41
(Minn. App. 2004) (holding that courts have inherent expungement power when re-
tention of records will result in infringement of petitioner's constitutional rights or
when benefits of expungement to petitioner are commensurate with disadvantages to
public).
25. See, e.g., Meinken v. Burgess, 426 S.E.2d 863, 866 (Ga. 1993) (holding that
a balancing test between the defendant's interest in having criminal records expunged
and the state's interest in retention of the records should be used in determining
whether to issue equitable expungement).
26. See. e.g., Kuenzle v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 865 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993);
Buckler v. Johnson County Sheriff's Dep't, 798 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. App. 1989).
27. See, e.g., Kuenzle, 865 S.W.2d 667; Buckler, 798 S.W.2d at 158.
28. See Ford v. Dir. of Revenue, 11 S.W.3d 106, 110 (Mo. App. 2000).
29. Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
30. David L. Naumann, Meaningful Reform of Expungement Law of a Midsum-
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[A]ny record of arrest recorded pursuant to section 43.503, RSMo,
may be expunged if the court determines that the arrest was based
on false information and the following conditions exist: (1) There
is no probable cause, at the time of the action to expunge, to be-
lieve the individual committed the offense; (2) No charges will be
pursued as a result of the arrest; (3) The subject of the arrest has no
prior or subsequent misdemeanor or felony convictions; (4) The
subject of the arrest did not receive a suspended imposition of sen-
tence for the offense for which the arrest was made or for any of-
fense related to the arrest; and (5) No civil action is pending relat-
ing to the arrest or the records sought to be expunged.32
This provision outlined for the Missouri courts, for the first time, the statutory
requirements for ordering expungement of criminal records.33 Additionally,
section 610.126(2), as amended in 1995, mandates that, "[e]xcept as provided
by sections 610.122 to 610.126, the courts of this state shall have no legal or
equitable authority to close or expunge any arrest record.
' 34
In Kuenzle v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, a petitioner requested ex-
pungement of his criminal records under the court's equitable powers. 35 The
Missouri Supreme Court ruled that Missouri courts no longer had such au-
thority, stating, "'Equity Courts may not disregard a statutory provision, for
where the Legislature has enacted a statute which governs and determines
rights of the parties under stated circumstances, equity courts equally with
courts of law are bound thereby.' 36 Since the legislature had specifically
provided for expungement of certain criminal records under enumerated cir-
cumstances in section 610.122, the courts no longer had the equitable author-
ity to expunge criminal records in cases not meeting the statutory require-
ments. 37 Kuenzle, however, preceded the 1995 amendment of section
610.122, and prior to In re Dyer, the Missouri Supreme Court had not exam-
ined how the amendment influenced the inherent equitable power of Missouri
courts to expunge criminal records.38
32. Mo. REV. STAT. (2000). According to the Historical and Statutory Notes,
"The 1995 amendment inserted 'or subsequent misdemeanor' in clause (3), rewrote
clause (4), which previously was a limitations provision and added clause (5), relating
to pendency of civil action."
33. Naumann, supra note 30, at 32.
34. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.126(2) (2000).
35. Kuenzle v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 865 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Mo. 1993) (en
banc).
36. Id. at 669 (quoting Milgram v. Jiffy Equip. Co., 247 S.W.2d 668, 676-77
(Mo. 1952)).
37. Id.
38. Lower Missouri courts had examined this issue prior to Dyer. See. e.g., Ford
v. Dir. of Revenue, 11 S.W.3d 106 (Mo. App. 2000) (holding that the trial court
2006]
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C. The One Subject Matter and Clear Title Rules
The Missouri Constitution states, "No bill shall contain more than one
subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title." 39 This provision provides
two separate limitations to the state legislature's procedural powers: (1) a bill
may only address one subject matter, and (2) the subject of every bill must be
clearly expressed in the title.40 The language of this provision is clearly a
mandatory, as opposed to discretionary, direction to the state courts. 1 The
Missouri Supreme Court has detailed the various functions this provision
serves, including the encouragement of disciplined procedure, prevention of
surprise, deterrence of logrolling, 42 promotion of public awareness and under-
standing of pending legislation, and preservation of clear choices for the gov-
ernor when deciding whether to exercise the veto power.43 In sum, the rules
act to prevent "fraudulent, misleading, and improper legislation.
'
"
The Missouri Supreme Court has established standards for determining
whether a bill violates the clear title rule.45 The title of a bill must generally
denote the type of legislation enacted.46 Thus, if the subject matter of any bill
exceeds the limits of the title, the title and the bill should be ruled constitu-
tionally invalid.47 The court does not, however, require that the title of a bill
include every detail or aspect of the bill itself; a title depicting the "general
content" of the bill is constitutionally sufficient.48 A title can be too general,
however, if it is so vague that the contents of the underlying bill cannot be
reasonably ascertained.49
lacked the inherent equitable power to expunge criminal records where a statute ex-
isted governing the expungement of such records).
39. Mo. CONST. art. III, § 23.
40. Carmack v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Agric., 945 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Mo. 1997) (en
banc).
41. Id.
42. Logrolling is defined as "[t]he exchanging of political favors; esp[ecially],
the trading of votes among legislators to gain support of measures that are beneficial
to each legislator's constituency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 960 (8th ed. 2004).
43. Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325-26 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
44. Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424,429 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
45. Nat'l Solid Waste Ass'n v. Dir. of Dep't of Natural Res., 964 S.W.2d 818,
820 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (quoting Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 429).
46. Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 428.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 429.
49. Id. For examples of titles held to violate the clear title rule, see Home Build-
ers Ass'n of Greater St. Louis v. State, 75 S.W.3d 267, 270-71 (Mo. 2002) (en bane)
(holding that the title "relating to property ownership" fails the clear title require-
ment); St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145, 147-49 (Mo. 1998)
(en banc) (holding that the title "An Act To repeal sections 355.176, 355.331, 402.215
and 473.657, RSMo 1994, relating to certain incorporated and non-incorporated en-
(Vol. 71
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Additionally, the Missouri Supreme Court has established a test for de-
termining whether a bill violates the single subject rule. To contain only one
subject, the provisions of a bill must "fairly relate to the same subject, have
natural connection therewith or [be] incidents or means to accomplish its
purpose."50 The initial inquiry in determining whether a bill meets this test
centers on the title, assuming the title is not too broad to violate the clear title
rule.5' To meet the requirements of the test, the challenged provision must
relate to or have a connection with the subject expressed in the title or be a
method to accomplish the purpose of the bill.5 2 If a court finds that a bill vio-
lates the single subject rule, the entire bill is unconstitutional "unless the
Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the bill's multiple
subjects is its original, controlling purpose and that the other subjects are
not." 3 If a court determines the original, central purpose of a bill, the court
may remove the unconstitutional portions of the bill dealing with other sub-
jects and allow the remainder of the bill dealing with the primary purpose to
stand.54
Despite these restrictions, Missouri courts afford legislative acts a
"strong presumption of constitutionality." 55 In keeping with this presumption,
procedural attacks on legislation are disfavored by the courts.56 Thus, all
doubts regarding the procedural constitutional validity of legislative acts are
resolved in favor of the acts, and courts require a finding of clear constitu-
tional procedural violation before rendering any legislative act unconstitu-
tional.57 Additionally, courts will seek to avoid interpretations of legislative
acts that are limiting or destructive. 58 Finally, the party asserting that a legis-
lative act is an unconstitutional violation of one of these requirements bears
the burden of proof.59
tites, and to enact in lieu thereof eleven new sections relating to the same subject"
fails the clear title requirement).
50. Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 6 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc).
51. Mo. Health Care Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 953 S.W.2d 617, 622 (Mo. 1997)
(en banc).
52. Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 428. For an example of the court's analysis in finding a
violation of the single subject rule, see Carmack v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Agric., 945
S.W.2d 956 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
53. Carmack, 945 S.W.2d at 961 (quoting Hammerschmidt v. Boone County,
877 S.W.2d 98, 103) (Mo. 1994) (en banc)).
54. Id.




59. Fust v. Attorney General, 947 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
2006]
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D. National Security Clearance
Protecting delicate national information from foreign nations or organi-
zations and seditious internal forces is essential to the national security of the
United States. 60 Secrecy is necessary in part because, during both war and
peace, a lapse in confidentiality of sensitive data can present military oppo-
nents with advantages in successfully defending against military operations or
developing new military technologies. 6 ' Furthermore, protected and secure
intelligence operations are integral to obtaining adequate warning of poten-
tially threatening activity (particularly given the heightened risk of terrorism
present today) and maintaining beneficial diplomatic relationships with other
nations.
62
Given the significant need for protecting sensitive information, the Ex-
ecutive Branch has developed an extensive security clearance process for
federal government employees.63 Through the grant of a security clearance,
the federal government places its trust in the recipient to appropriately handle
sensitive information.64 A security clearance is necessary for many federal
government jobs, and the denial or revocation of a security clearance often
results in an employee's termination. 65 The denial or revocation of an indi-
vidual's security clearance can additionally result in difficulties obtaining
other comparable employment and in stigmatization as a disloyal citizen.
66
The current security clearance system has its origins in Executive Orders
issued by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower following World War 1.67 On
March 21, 1947, President Truman issued Executive Order 9,835, which es-
tablished uniform standards and procedures for evaluation of the loyalty of all
current and prospective employees in every federal department and agency of
the Executive Branch.68 If an investigation revealed that "reasonable grounds
exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the
United States," the Order authorized the termination of a current federal gov-
ernment employee or the refusal of employment to a prospective federal gov-
60. David C. Mayer, Note, Reviewing the National Security Clearance Deci-
sions: The Clash Between Title VII and Bivens Claims, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 786, 792
(2000).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 792-93.
63. Id. at 793.
64. William H. Miller, Comment, A Position of Trust: Security Clearance Deci-
sions After September 11, 2001, 14 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 229, 229 (2004).
65. Id. at 230.
66. Mayer, supra note 60.
67. See id. at 793-94.
68. Exec. Order No. 9,835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947). For a more in-
depth discussion of Executive Order 9835, see Michael E. Parrish, A Lawyer in Crisis
Times: Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The Loyalty-Security Program, and the Defense of Civil
Liberties in the Early Cold War, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1799, 1807-10 (2004).
[Vol. 71
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ernment employee.69 Factors in determining an individual's loyalty included
evidence of espionage, treason, advocacy of revolution against the United
States, or unauthorized disclosure of confidential information; performance of
employment duties in a manner indicative of service to another government;
or membership in a blacklisted organization.70
President Eisenhower superseded Executive Order 9,835 and expanded
the federal government's security clearance program through Executive Order
10,450, issued on April 27, 1953. 7' The Order began by stating that national
security required that "all persons privileged to be employed in the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good
conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United
States.''72 In addition to the factors utilized under Executive Order 9,835 in
determining an individual's loyalty, the new Order added:
The investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be de-
signed to develop information as to whether the employment or re-
tention in employment in the Federal service of the person being
investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security. Such information shall relate, but not be limited, to the
following: (1) Depending on the relation of the Government em-
ployment to the national security: (i) Any behavior, activities, or
associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable
or trustworthy. (ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifica-
tions, or omissions of material facts. (iii) Any criminal, infamous,
dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual
use of intoxicants to excess, drug addition, or sexual perversion.
(iv) An adjudication of insanity, or treatment for serious mental or
neurological disorder without satisfactory evidence of cure. (v)
Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may
be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause
him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security. 7
On November 5, 1953, President Eisenhower further defined the federal
government's security clearance system by issuing Executive Order 10,501,
which established classification categories for delicate national information.74
The depth of investigation to determine whether or not to a grant security
clearance varied based on the type of information the individuals would have
69. Exec. Order 9,835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947).
70. Id.
71. Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Exec. Order No. 10,501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049 (Nov. 5, 1953). The classifica-
tion categories were Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential. Id.
2006]
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access to as part of their employment. 75 Although subsequent Executive Or-
ders have further refined the federal government's security clearance sys-
76 7tem, Executive Order 10,450 remains largely in effect today." The current
factors taken into consideration in a security clearance investigation include
allegiance to the United States, foreign influence, foreign preference, sexual
behavior, personal conduct, financial considerations, alcohol consumption,
drug involvement, criminal conduct, security violations, outside activities,
and misuse of information technology. 78
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In In re Dyer, in an opinion authored by Judge Michael A. Wolff, the
Missouri Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court that had
granted the expungement of Dyer's criminal record either under section
610.122 or the court's inherent equitable powers, and had held that section
610.122 was an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses.79 Noting that section 610.122 represents the sole avenue for
expungement in Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court denied Dyer's petition
for expungement of his criminal record because the case did not satisfy the
elements of section 610.122.80 The court also upheld the procedural and con-
stitutional adequacy of section 610.122, thereby denying Dyer's claims that
the statute violated the clear title and one subject matter rules and Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses.
8 1
The court first concluded that the facts of the case did not satisfy the
elements necessary for expungement of records under section 610.122.82 The
court reasoned that three of the requirements of section 610.122 were not met
because Dyer's arrest was not based on false information, probable cause
existed to believe Dyer committed the offense, and Dyer received a sus-
pended imposition of sentence.8 3
75. Id.
76. See Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40245 (Aug. 2, 1995); Exec. Order
No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
77. See Miller, supra note 64.
78. Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information, 32 C.F.R. §§ 147.3-147.15 (2004).
79. In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
80. Id. at 918, 921.
81. Id. at 920.
82. Id. at 918-19. For a discussion of the elements necessary for expungement of
records under section 610.122, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 918. The remaining three requirements of section 610.122 were satis-
fied, however, because there were no pending charges relating to the incident, Dyer
had no prior convictions, and no civil actions were pending regarding the occurrence.
[Vol. 71
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In order to fulfill the false information requirement, the petitioner is re-
quired to show that at least some of the information relied on by the police in
making the arrest was based on a lie.84 The court held that Dyer did not meet
this burden because he admitted he had some involvement in the crime and
pleaded guilty.8 5 Thus, there was no evidence that a lie led the police to erro-
neously charge Dyer with forgery and theft.
8 6
Based on the same reasoning, the court held that probable cause existed
to arrest Dyer.8 7 After equating probable cause in this context with reasonable
cause, the court explained that, "[t]he false information requirement and the
probable cause requirement, when combined, 'necessarily imply and mean
that a petitioner... has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate at a hearing,
by a preponderance of the evidence.., his actual innocence of the offense for
which he was arrested."' 88 The court reasoned that, because it is unlikely
Dyer falsely or mistakenly pleaded guilty to forgery and theft, the pleadings
are strong evidence that Dyer was not actually innocent.8 9 Thus, Dyer failed
to meet his burden of establishing that probable cause did not exist to support
the arrest.
90
Finally, the court reasoned that even if Dyer's arrest was based on false
information and probable cause for arrest did not exist, Dyer's record was
still not eligible for expungement under section 610.122 because Dyer re-
ceived a suspended imposition of sentence for one of the forgery charges and
the theft charge.91 Section 610.122 explicitly bans expungement of records if
the petitioner received a suspended imposition of sentence.92 The court re-
jected Dyer's argument that because he received the suspended imposition of
sentence prior to the adoption of section 610.122, application of this element
to his case constituted an illegal ex post facto law. The trial court had ac-
cepted this argument by adding to section 610.122 a time frame that rendered
the element inapplicable to the present case.94 The Missouri Supreme Court,
however, rejected the premise that application of this element to Dyer's claim
would render section 610.122 an ex post facto law because the statute does
not deal with prior conduct. 95 Rather, the court concluded, the statute merely
regulates when a court is able to order the destruction of records.96 Conse-
84. Id. at 918-19.
85. Id. at 919.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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quently, the court held that Dyer's petition for expungement of records under
section 610.122 must necessarily fail.97
The court next ruled that section 610.122 is constitutional. 98 Dyer ar-
gued that section 610.122 is unconstitutional in three ways. 99 First, Dyer
maintained that the statute is an illegal ex post facto law.'°° The court rejected
this argument based on the same analysis used in regard to Dyer's argument
about his suspended imposition of sentence.10 1 Second, Dyer claimed that the
statute violated the one subject matter and clear title rules.10 2 Finally, Dyer
argued that the statute, by denying expungement to those who received a sus-
pended imposition of sentence, violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Sections 2 and 10 of the Missouri Constitution.1
0 3
The court rejected Dyer's argument based on the one subject matter and
clear titles rules.' 4 The bill enacted two provisions, one prohibiting a transla-
tor for a speech- or hearing-impaired person from disclosing a conversation
without the speech- or hearing-impaired person's consent, and the other es-
tablishing the requisite elements for expungement of criminal records.10 5 The
court reasoned that both these provisions deal with confidentiality, and thus,
the bill did not violate the one subject matter rule.10 6 Furthermore, since the
title of the bill, "related to the confidentiality of certain information," clearly
conveyed this subject matter, the court ruled that the bill did not violate the
clear title rule. 1
07
The court then addressed Dyer's substantive constitutional arguments.
108
The court quickly dismissed Dyer's due process claim by stating that Dyer
had not been deprived of the procedural rights associated with due process.
0 9
The court also rejected Dyer's equal protection claim, stating that the legisla-
tive distinction on the basis of suspended imposition of sentence is rational." 0
In explanation, the court stated that the government has an interest in the
maintenance of correct criminal records and denying expungement to those
who received a suspended imposition of sentence promotes this interest.l'
97. Id.
98. Id. at 920.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the court rejected Dyer's argument that Missouri courts have the
power to issue equitable expungement of records.l 2 Recognizing that Mis-
souri courts had previously exercised this power, the court held that through
the adoption of section 610.126, the legislature had eliminated this power.13
The court further held that the legislature had the authority to alter the equita-
ble power of Missouri courts pursuant to Article II, Section 1 of the Missouri
Constitution.' 14
Before concluding its decision, the court noted that even if it did have
the authority to issue equitable expungement, the present case likely did not
qualify because Dyer presented no evidence of an illegal prosecution, acquit-
tal, or other extraordinary circumstances.'* 5 Despite this, the court expressed
sympathy regarding the seemingly harsh result dictated by the current state of
the law.1 6 The court stated, "[tihe harm Dyer suffered from this 15-year-old
arrest record is caused by the policies of the federal Department of Homeland
Security on security clearances, and this Court is not in a position to deter-
mine whether such policies are rational or irrational."' 17 The court then noted
that, as an alternative, Dyer could seek a pardon from the governor, but
whether this would satisfy the Federal Department of Homeland Security's
standards was unknown." 1
8
V. COMMENT
Although producing a seemingly harsh result, the unwillingness of Mis-
souri courts to afford Dyer the relief necessary for him to remain employed
was ultimately correct. At least a few grounds exist upon which the Missouri
Supreme Court could have circumvented section 610.122 and granted Dyer
his requested relief - namely the clear title and one subject matter rules. The
Missouri Supreme Court, however, appropriately left resolution of the
broader problem - the potentially severe and far-reaching consequences of
the current national security clearance system - to the federal government.
This section will examine the decision's treatment of the clear title and one
subject matter rules, the decision's relationship to the current national secu-
rity clearance regime, and possible ramifications and results of the decision.
In the 1995 legislative session, Missouri House Bill 135 amended sec-
tion 610.122 and added the subsequent arrests, suspended imposition of sen-
tence, and civil action requirements necessary for a court to issue an ex-
112. Id. at 921.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 921, n.4.
116. Id. at 921.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 921, n.3.
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pungement of criminal records. 19 House Bill 135 additionally made conver-
sations between a speech- or hearing-impaired person and a translator inad-
missible as evidence without the consent of the speech- or hearing-impaired
person. 12 The title of House Bill 135 was "relating to the confidentiality of
certain information."'1
21
In examining the two provisions enacted by House Bill 135, the court
had at least some room to find violations of the clear title and one subject
matter rules. A bill can violate the clear title rule if the title fails to denote the
general type of legislation enacted or is too vague to reasonably ascertain the
122subject of the bill. The title of House Bill 135 merely stated that it dealt
with the confidentiality of certain information. 23 Both of the provisions of
House Bill 135 deal, in the broadest sense, with confidentiality of specific
information. In a narrower sense, however, they do not appear to relate to the
same subject matter at all. One deals with the admissibility of evidence re-
garding conversations between a translator and speech- or hearing-impaired
person, and the other deals with the expungement of criminal records. These
two provisions will rarely, if ever, apply in the same factual situation. Addi-
tionally, they do not address the same type of information. One protects the
disclosure of information in a confidential relationship and the other deals
with judicial authority to dispose of an individual's criminal record. Further-
more, the provisions do not relate to the same point in a judicial proceeding.
One limits admissibility of evidence, and the other limits the disposal of
criminal records after all judicial proceedings are complete. Thus, in all
senses other than the broad title of confidentiality, the provisions appear to be
wholly different.
Given this analysis, the court could have made a reasonable argument
that House Bill 135 violated the clear title and one subject matter rules be-
cause it contained provisions dealing with two different subjects and the ref-
erence in the title to confidentiality was too vague to ascertain the subjects of
the bill. The court then could have ruled the entire bill unconstitutional. 24
Without section 610.122, the court might have ruled that Missouri courts still
retained the inherent equitable authority to expunge criminal records. Given
the high standards Missouri courts used to justify equitable expungement,
however, it is unlikely the present case would have qualified for equitable
expungement even if section 610.122 was unconstitutional.
119. H.B. 135, 1995 Leg. (Mo. 1995).
120. In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d at 920.
121. Id.
122. See supra Section Ill(C).
123. In reDyer, 163 S.W.3d at 920.
124. See supra Section Ill(C). As an alternative to finding the entire bill unconsti-
tutional, the court could have found one of the two provisions to be the original pur-
pose, in which case, it could have only struck the other provision and left the remain-
der of the bill intact. Id.
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Instead of conducting a similar analysis of the clear title and one subject
matter rules, the court, in seven sentences and without detailed discussion,
dismissed Dyer's claim and ruled that House Bill 135 was constitutionally
sound. 125 The lack of detailed consideration of the clear title and one subject
matter rules appears particularly odd in light of the court's recognition of the
unfortunate result.126 Rather than leaving resolution of this situation entirely
to the Federal Department of Homeland Security, the Missouri legislature, or
the Missouri governor, the court could have taken an initial step toward re-
solving the problem, even if the outcome in the present case would have re-
mained the same. 127 Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court could have ruled
section 610.122 unconstitutional under the clear title and one subject matter
rules. Looking at the broader picture and considering national security con-
cerns, however, it was appropriate for the court not to do so.
First of all, even prior to the adoption of section 610.122, Missouri
courts ordered expungement of a criminal record only in extraordinary cir-
cumstances that typically indicated the individual had been wrongly con-
victed. 128 Dyer provided no evidence that he was wrongly convicted. 129
Additionally, the only reason the Missouri courts even considered ex-
pungement of Dyer's record was because of its effect on his employment.
Understandably, the court felt sympathy for the fact that Dyer suffered loss of
employment due to a fifteen-year-old arrest record. The court, however, was
ultimately correct in avoiding the temptation to use the clear title and one
subject matter rules to find section 610.122 unconstitutional simply to rectify
one attenuated result. The court recognized that Missouri's expungement
system did not cause Dyer the loss of his job; the national security clearance
criteria and Dyer's past crimes were the true causes. Thus, the court would
not have been justified in finding the entire statute structurally unconstitu-
tional to provide relief for one individual.
National security considerations support the court's decision. The fed-
eral government has established an extensive system for determining the
trustworthiness of federal government employees.' 30 Security clearance in-
vestigations examine, along with a host of other factors, an individual's
criminal activity. 13 The federal government has made a determination that
prior criminal records are important in examining an individual's loyalty. It
does not make sense for the Missouri courts to circumvent this determination
125. In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d at 920.
126. See id. at 921.
127. It is possible that the court was swayed by the fact that rendering the bill
unconstitutional would likely not have affected the outcome of the case and by the
strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislative acts.
128. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
129. In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d at 918-19.
130. See supra Section Ill(D).
131. Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information, 32 C.F.R. §§ 147.3-147.15 (2004).
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by eliminating all traces of an individual's criminal record. If the court had
granted the expungement relief, it would have effectively pronounced that
Dyer's criminal record was not a sufficient justification for his loss of secu-
rity clearance. More importantly, the Missouri Supreme Court would have
substituted its judgment regarding what is best for national security for that of
the federal government. The federal government is in a much better position
than the Missouri Supreme Court to determine who should and should not be
granted security clearances.
Furthermore, the criminal record criterion seems rational in a security
clearance investigation. Dyer was convicted of theft.132 Few other crimes are
more relevant in determining someone's capacity for appropriately handling
confidential information than one dealing with the unlawful taking of an-
other's property. Even if Dyer did not actually pose a security threat, given
the increased risk of terrorism today, it is rational for the federal government
to adopt uniform criteria that operate to prevent an individual from obtaining a
security clearance, and to err on the side of caution when applying the criteria.
Even if the Missouri Supreme Court had taken the series of steps neces-
sary for expungement of Dyer's record, the intended benefit - the reinstate-
ment of Dyer's security clearance and employment - was not guaranteed. If
the court had expunged Dyer's criminal record, this expungement would not
have erased the federal government's records regarding Dyer's criminal his-
tory. Absent a finding of Dyer's actual innocence of the underlying crimes, it
is unlikely that the federal government would suddenly be persuaded that
Dyer's criminal history did not provide a basis for denying security clearance.
Given the probability that the requested relief would not produce the desired
result, the court had even less incentive to find a method by which it could
grant an expungement of Dyer's criminal record.
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in this case not only reached the
correct result, it also clarified existing Missouri law. First, the decision firmly
established the constitutionality and vitality of section 610.122 in limiting the
authority of Missouri courts to order expungement of criminal records. The
court explicitly held that section 610.122 is the sole judicial method for order-
ing expungement of criminal records. Thus, Missouri courts, unlike many
courts in the country, now clearly lack the inherent equitable power of ex-
pungement. Second, Dyer clearly defined the requisite elements of section
610.122 and determined that if any of the elements are not satisfied, Missouri
courts are without power to offer any type of relief. Finally, the court left the
burden of resolving situations like Dyer's - situations in which a seemingly
sympathetic individual is precluded from working in certain occupations be-
cause of a previous conviction - to either the federal government or other
branches of the state government. Thus, while Dyer and others like him may
have other available avenues of relief, it is clear that, at least for the foresee-
132. In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d at 917.
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able future, the Missouri Supreme Court has removed the Missouri judiciary
from the dispute.
VI. CONCLUSION
In In re Dyer, the Missouri Supreme Court correctly denied Dyer's re-
quest for expungement of his criminal records because the elements of the
constitutionally valid section 610.122 were not satisfied and because Missouri
courts lack the inherent equitable power to expunge criminal records.'33 This
decision firmly established section 610.122 as the exclusive method of judi-
cial expungement of criminal records in Missouri and left resolution of situa-
tions like Dyer's to the federal government or a different branch of the Mis-
souri government.
MEGAN DUNN
133. Id. at 918.
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